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Abstract
The theory of money assumes decentralized bilateral exchange and excludes centralized
multilateral exchange. However, endogenizing the exchange process is critical for under-
standing the conditions that support the use of money. We develop a “travelling game”
to study the emergence of decentralized and centralized exchange, theoretically and ex-
perimentally. Players located on separate islands can either trade locally, or pay a cost to
trade elsewhere, so decentralized and centralized markets can both emerge in equilibrium.
The former minimize trade costs through monetary exchange; the latter maximizes overall
surplus through non-monetary exchange. Monetary trade emerges when coordination is
problematic, while centralized trade emerges otherwise. This shows that to understand
the emergence of money it is important to amend standard theory such that the market
structure is endogenized.
Keywords: endogenous institutions, macroeconomic experiments, matching, coordination,
markets, money.
JEL codes: E4, E5, C9, C92
∗ We thank Co-Editor Imran Rasul and four anonymous referees for many helpful suggestions
and comments that substantially improved this study from an earlier version. We also thank A.
Baron, A. Chachmon, I. Feder, U. Rochev and, especially, I. Dekel, for research and programming
assistance, as well as seminar participants at the Technical University of Berlin, GATE-Lyon,
and participants at the 2013 and 2015 SAET Meetings and the 2015 and 2018 ESA International
Meetings for comments. D. Goldberg and A. Weiss gratefully acknowledge research support from
the Israel Science Foundation (grant No. 1004/11). Correspondence e-mail: camera@chapman.edu
1
1 Introduction
In its most basic form, a model economy is a collection of individuals who ex-
change the fruit of their specialized labor for something they desire but cannot
produce. Hence, welfare—individual and aggregate—hinges on the organization of
trade. Much of economic theory assumes traders interact in a centralized market
based on synchronous multilateral exchange. Yet, the monetary literature assumes
traders interact in a decentralized market through asynchronous bilateral exchanges.1
Here we ask: How would traders choose to organize their interactions? This
question is important because the organization of trade has implications for allo-
cations and the kind of assets that end up being traded. In particular, we are
interested in money. Standard monetary theory explains the existence of money as
an optimal response to the trade frictions inherent to decentralized exchange, and
in particular a bilateral matching process that precludes interaction within small
groups of fixed counterparts (Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989). These frictions under-
mine the possibility to coordinate on non-monetary equilibrium alternatives. But
in the theory of money the organization of trade is exogenous: bilateral exchange
is taken as a primitive, while multilateral exchange is arbitrarily restricted (Corbae
et al., 2003, p. 733). This is justified as being a consequence of economic special-
ization, and various impediments to organizing a centralized market (Lucas, 1984).
It is thus an open question to understand what conditions lend themselves to the
development of money, when we lift the restrictions on centralized trade. Would
traders prefer to synchronize all exchange in a single location, or bilaterally trade
across space and time using money? The few existing theoretical analyses indicate
that the emergence of centralized or decentralized markets generally depend on the
severity of trade frictions and costs from organizing trading activity (Camera, 2000;
1See Townsend (1980), Diamond (1984), Lucas (1984), or Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). In monetary
theory, decentralized market is a situation in which spatially separated players travel to specific
locations to trade asynchronously and in isolation from others, while centralized market means
that everyone meets and simultaneously trades in a specific location (Hellwig, 1993; Lucas, 1984).
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Goldberg, 2007). Here we design an experiment that makes these frictions and costs
explicit, with the aim to investigate the principles underlying the theory of money,
and not to reproduce and test a specific monetary model.
In the experiment, three specialized producers located on separate “islands”
(see Fig. 1) interact over multiple rounds of play. Each produces one of three
differentiated goods and derives a benefit from consuming someone else’s good.
Hence, there are gains from trade. Players can travel round-trip to any island at
a cost that depends on the good transported. This implies a tradeoff: the player’s
payoff rises with the frequency of consumption but falls with that of travel. Surplus is
created only if at least two players coordinate on where and when to meet, which is a
non-trivial problem to solve because cost disparities imply conflicting incentives, and
choices are made independently, simultaneously and without prior communication.
23 12
31
Figure 1: The travelling game
Notes: The larger number is equivalently the player’s island, type, and consumption good; the
smaller is the player’s production good. The arrows denote the possible directions of travel.
In this “travelling game” exchange can take two natural forms: simultaneous
and multilateral on one island, or asynchronous and bilateral across islands (Lucas,
1984). The first gives rise to a centralized market (CM) on the island producing the
high transport-cost good; the second to a decentralized market (DM) supported by a
monetary system in which the low transport-cost good serves an explicit medium-of-
exchange function. In Nash equilibrium non-monetary CM and monetary DM trade
coexist, and CM is socially efficient. Yet, there is no obvious reason to expect that
one equilibrium should prevail over the other since players have conflicting incen-
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tives. We thus turn to the intuitions from monetary theory to formulate predictions.
The monetary literature has put forward the notion that there is no role for
money if its use cannot expand the set of payoffs (Corbae et al., 2003; Kocherlakota,
1998); the underlying idea is that individuals naturally coordinate on efficient play.
Bilateral matching frictions help explain the existence of money because they un-
dermine coordination on non-monetary equilibria. But money is used also because
individuals are persistently focused on a single economic task, an extreme form of
specialization that makes barter impractical (Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989). To probe
these intuitions, we contrast the frictionless baseline design—where players’ roles
and counterparts are fixed for the session—with treatments manipulating various
aspects of the design. In one case, we periodically rematch players into new groups
so counterparts randomly change during the session. In another treatment, we scale
up the group in order to assign travelers to a random island of the type that they
seek. These manipulations introduce trade frictions that should boost monetary
exchange. Two other treatments relax the extreme form of specialization typical of
monetary models: in one, players’ types rotate throughout the session, which main-
tains the equilibrium set unaltered but expands players’ focus from one to multiple
economic tasks; in the other, producers can diversify their output and then barter
it, which alters the equilibrium set but maintains the single-task focus. We also con-
sider an environment in which commodity and fiat money compete, and pre-play
communication allows explicit coordination of strategies.
We find mixed support for the intuitions from the monetary literature. In treat-
ments with rotation, subjects learned to coordinate on conducting non-monetary
trade multilaterally in a centralized market—in line with the notion that money
should not be used when more efficient trading arrangements exist. When we scaled-
up groups, or periodically reshuﬄed them, we also observe that subjects learned to
coordinate on monetary trade. But, we also see that monetary DM trade, not
the socially efficient CM, prevailed in the frictionless, fixed-types baseline design,
4
in contrast with theoretical intuitions. Moreover, centralized markets emerged as
the dominant trading arrangement only when subjects could explicitly coordinate
strategies through pre-play communication. And when we added the options to
diversify and barter production, or to carry a token at no cost, barter trade and fiat
monetary trade emerged, which crowded out a more efficient trading arrangement.
These observations suggest ways to improve the theory of money, which tradi-
tionally precludes multilateral centralized trade. In our experiment, relaxing that
constraint inhibited the use of money, challenging the use of exogenous restrictions
on the organization of trade. Yet, decentralized monetary trade was pervasive be-
cause coordination problems made organizing socially efficient CM trade challenging.
This is consistent with the monetary theory view that trade is decentralized because
organizing a centralized market is impractical. Subjects could coordinate on non-
monetary CM through tacit means, but trade was primarily bilateral, decentralized
and monetary. Type rotation mitigated coordination problems by re-aligning incen-
tives, but CM trade prevailed only when strategic uncertainty could be managed
through explicit and costless communication. The idea that the organization of
exchange purely reflects a natural tendency to coordinate on efficient play is empir-
ically problematic, suggesting that incorporating considerations about coordination
problems in existing monetary theory can help reduce the disconnect between the-
ory and laboratory data. This same insight emerges from non-monetary games
(Heinemann et al., 1989; Van Huyck et al., 2007) and monetary experiments with a
different design (Camera and Casari, 2014; Camera et al., 2013). A unique insight
of our study is that monetary trade appears to be a resilient trading arrangement,
one that is robust to allowing for multilateral trade.
2 Related experimental literature
There is a small but growing experimental literature on money, which can be orga-
nized according to two key design features: whether the market structure is taken
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as a primitive or is endogenous, and whether non-monetary equilibria theoretically
exist that can improve overall efficiency beyond what can be achieved through mon-
etary trade. Table 1 situates our experiment within this literature.
Table 1: Monetary experiments: a map
Cannot improve upon Can improve upon
monetary trade monetary trade
Exogenous
market
structure
McCabe (1989), Lian & Plott
(1998), Duffy & Ochs (1999),
Camera et al. (2003), Duffy
& Puzzello (2014), etc.
Camera et al. (2013),
Camera & Casari (2014)
Endogenous
market
structure
Bigoni et al. (forth.) This study
The majority of experiments lies in the top-left quadrant, where the market
structure is exogenous and monetary equilibrium lies on the (constrained) efficiency
frontier. These experiments can be further subdivided into two groups, depending
on whether money has intrinsic value or is a barren token. Several experiments
study the endogenous valuation of a fiat money by adopting a competitive market
design, as in McCabe (1989), Marimon and Sunder (1993), Lian and Plott (1998),
Camera et al. (2003), Deck et al. (2006), and Huber et al. (2014). In these designs,
all players operate in a market in which they must submit monetary bids to buy
consumption goods, i.e., there is an explicit “cash-in-advance” constraint, which
automatically imposes the use of a fiat-money system.
Other studies seek to uncover what commodity will become the medium of ex-
change in the bilateral random matching model of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989).
Examples include Brown (1996) and Duffy and Ochs (1999), where players of three
types own a good they cannot consume, but can exchange for their consumption
good through a sequence of random encounters. A characteristic of these designs
6
is that players can consume only if they use a commodity as a money, the only al-
ternative to commodity-money trade being autarky—which automatically imposes
the use of a commodity-money system. By contrast, we study the emergence of a
commodity-money system when autarky is not the only alternative to trade and, in
fact, a non-monetary trading arrangement co-exists that increases overall surplus.
This gives rise to equilibrium multiplicity, monetary and not, and therefore situates
our experiment in the larger experimental literature about coordination in games
(e.g., Heinemann et al., 1989; Van Huyck et al., 2007; Weber, 2006).
There are previous experimental designs that admit multiple equilibria, mone-
tary and not, in which a monetary system is not imposed but where players face
coordination problems. In some of these studies fiat monetary equilibrium lies on
the efficiency frontier (Bigoni et al., 2018; Duffy and Puzzello, 2014); in others, sub-
jects can theoretically improve overall efficiency by coordinating on a non-monetary
equilibrium (Camera and Casari, 2014; Camera et al., 2013). Yet, in all of these
experiments the market structure is taken as a primitive: subjects are not free to
modify their environment to mitigate trade frictions. In particular, they cannot
choose which or how many counterparts to meet in a round, and where to meet.
This last feature differentiates our design from the only monetary experiment that,
to our knowledge, endogenizes an aspect of the market structure (its size). In Bigoni
et al. (forth.), homogeneous players have the option to form a large group where
counterparts change at random, or to be paired to a fixed counterpart. Either way,
interaction is always bilateral and asynchronous. We contribute to this investigation
of endogenous trading institutions, by granting subjects the freedom to congregate
with multiple counterparts, trading multilaterally and synchronously. Another in-
novation in the design is to consider different structures of incentives to coordinate.
In the typical monetary experiment the incentives are assumed perfectly aligned
across players. Instead, we consider the case in which, though everyone benefits
from coordinating on some equilibrium, the incentives are conflicting.
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3 Experimental design
We present the Baseline design, and then discuss the treatment manipulations.
The travelling game: The experiment consists of a coordination task, called the
travelling game illustrated in Fig. 1. It is played by a group of 3 subjects who can
earn benefits by meeting and trading with others.
At the start of the game each subject is randomly assigned to one of three
virtual islands j = 1, 2, 3. The island j corresponds to the subject’s production
and consumption specialization type (or simply, type): he produces one good j + 1
(modulo 3) that is of no value to him, and earns a benefit u only by obtaining one
good j, which he consumes upon receiving it.2 To earn this benefit, a subject of type
j must meet and trade with a counterpart who holds good j. To do so, a subject
can stay on his home island, hoping to be visited by other subjects, or can travel
round-trip to another island of his choice. Travel is costly; each leg of travel with
good k generates a loss ck with c1 < c2 < u < c3. This all but rules out travel with
good 3 because travelling to trade that good is individually irrational, as it cannot
generate a positive net benefit u− c3. We set u = 12 points, while c1 = 1, c2 = 10,
and c3 = 15 points; 10 points were converted into 1 New Israeli Shekel (NIS) at the
end of the experiment. Subjects played multiple rounds of this game.
A round of play: Each round is divided into two stages. In each stage subjects
make independent and simultaneous choices, without communicating with others.
In the travelling stage subjects see the distribution of goods across islands, must
choose whether or not to travel, and, if so, to which island. Following these choices,
meetings are realized: a subject can meet one or two other counterparts (=bilateral
or trilateral meeting), or can remain unmatched. Matched subjects proceed to the
trading stage, in which they participate in a direct mechanism that allows them to
2The terminology in the sessions is less technical: player 1 is a Fisherman who produces fish and
consumes fowl, player 2 is a Farmer who produces bread and consumes fish, and player 3 is a
Hunter who produces fowl and consumes bread.
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re-allocate their goods (=trade). Roughly speaking, trade takes place if and only if
there is consensus about the proposed reallocation from all parties involved; other-
wise, everyone exits the meeting with the good they carried. Unilateral transfers are
assumed away, to capture the main feature of the standard monetary model where
all exchanges are quid-pro-quo (Ostroy and Starr, 1990; Starr, 1972). Hence, in a
meeting there can be either trade or “autarky,” as discussed below.
In a bilateral meeting, subjects simultaneously choose whether or not to swap
their goods. In a trilateral meeting where all good types are available subjects are
given the option to reallocate goods from producers to consumers (=trading chain).
Absent mutual consent, or if not all good types are available in the meeting, then the
player who did not travel can propose a bilateral trade to someone else. Hence, in
a trilateral meeting there are three possible outcomes: there is either one trilateral
trade, one bilateral trade, or no trade at all.
Subjects cannot hold more than one good at a time and cannot dispose of it.
Round-trip travel implies that everyone starts each round on their home island with
some good. Those who consume have no inventory for the return trip (so, no cost),
and start the next round with a new production good. Those who do not consume
bring their end-of-round inventory into the next round.
A session: Each session involves a multiple of 3 participants (min = 6, max = 27,
depending on subjects’ availability). At the session start subjects are divided into
interaction groups of three, and each subject is randomly assigned a type 1, 2 or 3. In
the Baseline design groups and types are fixed for the session. Denoting economy
the set of participants who can meet during a session, economy and interaction
group correspond when groups are fixed.
Each session consists of at most six sequences of the travelling game (six blocks).
A block starts and terminates simultaneously for everyone in the session. Each block
is composed of an uncertain number of rounds of the travelling game. Subjects are
informed that they will play six rounds, and from then on, after each round the
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block will continue with probability 0.75, and otherwise it will stop. The expected
duration of each block is thus 9 rounds. A computer randomly selected an integer
number between 1 and 100 from a uniform distribution, and displayed it to subjects.
The block terminated when a number greater than 75 was selected. We can interpret
the probability 0.75 as the geometric discount factor of a risk-neutral subject. When
a block stopped a new one started if there was sufficient time left in the session;
otherwise, the session ended. Subjects were informed of this procedure and that
they would play at most six blocks.
Other treatments: We have run eight additional treatments. Four treatments ma-
nipulate stability of types and of counterparts, and the others manipulate different
aspects of the environment; see Table 2.
Table 2: Treatments
Fixed types Rotating types
Stable
counterparts
Baseline
Chat
Fiat
Baseline-R
No CM
Barter
Unstable
counterparts
Rematch
Large Rematch-R
In Baseline, three counterparts interact for the whole session. In Rematch
and Rematch-R, counterparts are unstable as session participants are randomly
reassigned to a three-player group at the start of each block, using a strangers match-
ing protocol; hence, an economy comprises multiple groups (from 2 to 9 depending
on the size of the session). In Large, counterparts are unstable because we scale up
the interaction group to be between 12 and 24, and use strangers matching in each
round to allocate travelers to islands. Someone who selects to visit island j is placed
10
with equal probability in any of the multiple islands of type j, so players cannot
choose to meet a specific counterpart (details in Supplementary Information).
In Baseline, the subject’s type is fixed for the session, so each individual is per-
sistently focused on a single economic task. This extreme form of specialization is
typical of monetary models, and it is assumed to preclude barter (e.g., Kiyotaki and
Wright, 1989). We relax this assumption in Baseline-R and Rematch-R. Here,
the participant’s type rotates with each new block (e.g., 1,2,3; 2,3,1; 3,2,1, etc.)
so each subject can produce and consume all good types during the session. This
alternation in economic tasks can be seen as a form of diversification (less special-
ization), which is theoretically inconsequential—it does not expand the equilibrium
set and, in particular, it still precludes barter. We expand the equilibrium set in
the Barter treatment, which alters Baseline-R by giving subject j the option to
switch production good—from their specialty good j + 1 to j − 1 (modulo 3)—at
a cost of 2 points. This cost-variety tradeoff lets producers diversify production in
order to satisfy their consumption needs through barter, capturing the idea that
diversification is instrumental to barter (Camera et al., 2003).
In the aforementioned treatments there are multiple equilibria but subjects can-
not explicitly coordinate their strategies. To study the impact of coordination and
strategic uncertainty issues we ran the Chat treatment, where we augment the
Baseline design by giving subjects the ability to explicitly coordinate their actions
through a chat-box that is available for two minutes at the start of each block. To
study if subjects properly understood the structure of economic incentives, we ran
the No CM treatment, where we make travel with both goods 2 and 3 suboptimal
by altering the Baseline-R design by setting c2 = c3 = 15 points.
Finally, in Fiat we add one object, called token, to player 2’s initial endowment
in Baseline. Tokens cannot be produced or consumed, can be stored together with
one good, and are costless to transport. This expands the strategy set, allowing fiat
monetary trade where tokens circulate from island to island, and goods never move.
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To give the best chance to fiat money to arise in the limited session time, we mini-
mized the complexity of this treatment in two ways. Subjects could transport only
one object at a time, and in addition to the trade strategies available in Baseline,
they could also either buy their consumption good with a token on a different island,
or sell their production good for a token on their own island.
Procedural details: We recruited 513 undergraduate students from Bar Ilan Uni-
versity (approximately 40% males), through class announcements, social media and
advertisements on campus. We ran 47 sessions (for details, see the Supplementary
Information). The experiment was programmed using the software z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher, 2007). Instructions (see Supplementary Information) were read aloud at
the start of the experiment and left on the subjects’ desks. All sessions were con-
ducted in the Bar-Ilan University economics experimental lab, where subjects were
visually isolated in separate computer carrels. Subjects could not communicate,
except in the Chat sessions. Average earnings per subject were 80 NIS (min = 50
NIS, max = 122 NIS).3 Payments were structured so that subjects could potentially
earn similar amounts per round of play in each treatment. In the treatments with
type rotation, this was done by summing up all points earned in the session; in the
other treatments payments were re-scaled by the maximum points a subject could
have earned in the session, given his fixed type (see instructions). Subjects com-
pleted between 22 and 66 rounds in a session. Sessions lasted two hours including
the reading of instructions, a quiz, and payments.
4 Theoretical considerations
The game described above adapts to the lab the spatially-separated agents model
in Goldberg (2007). The setup retains three basic ingredients of standard monetary
models: specialized traders, unit storage, and single coincidence in bilateral meetings
3As a comparison, the minimum wage was 24 NIS, and average student wages 30 NIS.
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(Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989). It departs from existing theories by not taking bilateral
trade as a primitive: multilateral trade is possible in a centralized location.
To develop theoretical predictions, let j = 1, 2, 3 denote the player’s type, as-
suming each type is located on their “home” island j, and let t = 1, 2 . . . denote the
round. Players specialize in consumption and in production, must trade to consume,
and can direct their search to any island. Player j is endowed with one indivisible
good of type j + 1 (mod 3), but derives utility u > 0 only from consuming good
j. Hence, there is a need for trade. Players can hold just one good as inventory. If
they exchange it for their consumption good, they immediately consume and receive
a new unit endowment at the start of the following period. Goods can be traded
one-for-one but gifts are excluded, hence everyone has some good at the start of
every period. Future utility is discounted at rate β ∈ (0, 1).
Players start and end a period on their home island, having the option of making
one round-trip to any other island carrying good k = 1, 2, 3 at cost ck > 0 for each
leg of travel in which they carry a good, with c1 < c2 < u < c3. Travel choices
are made independently and simultaneously. As a result, a player can be in a
bilateral or trilateral meeting, or meet no-one in the period. In a meeting there is no
communication but everyone sees the type and inventory of the counterparts, after
which—if players have different inventories—a trade is proposed to all, as follows. In
a bilateral meeting players can either exchange their inventories, or do nothing. In a
trilateral meeting on island j trade is governed by a direct mechanism. If all goods
types are available, then a proposal is made to reallocate goods from producers
to consumers; this trilateral exchange is implemented only if there is consensus.
Otherwise, or if not all good types are available, player j and the producer of good
j are given the option to exchange their goods (if their goods are identical, then
player j is offered to trade with the remaining player).
There are generally many equilibria in this game, in which actions may or may
not depend on histories of play. We focus on Nash equilibria that are history inde-
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pendent (Markov-perfect) because this is the focus of the literature on the micro-
foundations of money. Two equilibria seem more natural than others, and have a
theoretical counterpart in studies about the endogenous emergence of (de)centralized
markets (Camera, 2000; Goldberg, 2007). One has decentralized asynchronous trade,
as players trade sequentially and bilaterally on different islands; this creates an ex-
plicit need for a medium of exchange, for which the low transport cost good 1 is the
natural candidate. This dynamic trading arrangement makes consumption infre-
quent but minimizes the cost of trading, thus granting moderate and similar payoffs
to all players. The other has centralized synchronous trade, as everyone always con-
gregates on island 2, a natural marketplace where the high transport cost good 3 is
produced. This static trading arrangement maximizes the consumption frequency,
but makes trade very costly for one player thus creating large disparities in payoffs.
23 12
31
1
t = 1, 3, . . .
21 1 12
31
t = 2, 4, . . .
Figure 2: Asynchronous decentralized trade (DM).
23 122
31
1
t = 1, 2, 3, . . .
Figure 3: Synchronous centralized trade (CM).
Notes: Players in a circle do not travel. Large number: type and island of player. Small number:
player’s inventory at start of round. Arrows: direction of travel and good transported.
Fig. 2-3 illustrate the two equilibria. Under decentralized trade, two players al-
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ternate travelling with good 1 to bilaterally exchange it for their consumption good.
In odd periods player 3 visits and trades with 2, while in even periods 2 visits and
trades with 1; player 1 never moves. This trade pattern gives rise to a decentralized
market (DM) where trade is monetary and bilateral; good 1 serves the role of money
as player 2 accepts it to later buy his consumption good. Our design thus makes the
transaction role of money explicit. Under centralized trade, the producer of good 3
is visited by the other two. Every period there is a trilateral meeting on island 2,
where each player j receives the production of player j− 1 (mod 3) and gives his to
j + 1 (mod 3). Player 2 never moves. This trade pattern gives rise to a centralized
market (CM), where trade is non-monetary and multilateral.
Importantly, player 2 “makes a market” in each period by either purchasing a
good he cannot consume and then re-trading it (DM), or by facilitating synchronous
exchange (CM). Hence, player 2 is pivotal for the emergence or breakdown of equi-
librium. In both CM and DM player 2 trades with every other player, and trades
in every period, so this player’s deviations are always consequential.
Proposition 1. In all treatments, except No CM, both CM and DM are a Nash
equilibrium. The equilibrium payoffs to type i = 1, 2, 3 in CM are
w1 =
u− c2
1− β < w3 =
u− c1
1− β < w2 =
u
1− β ,
while, letting s = 0, 1 denote even and odd periods, in DM we have
v1 =
βsu
1− β2 , v2 =
βs(u− c1)
1− β2 , v3 =
β1−s(u− c1)
1− β2 .
Proposition 2. CM is socially efficient but does not Pareto-dominate DM.
These results are formalized in the Appendix. The first simply requires an anal-
ysis of all possible deviations. For the second result, note that given the experimen-
tal parameters, the utility increment from maximizing the consumption frequency
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through CM dominates the travel cost increment it generates relative to DM. Nei-
ther CM nor DM equilibrium is Pareto-dominant because player 1 prefers DM to
CM, while the opposite is true for players 2 and 3.
Table 3: Payoffs in the average round, under CM and DM equilibrium.
Player 1 Player 2 Player 3 Average
CM 2 12 11 8.3
DM 6 5.5 5.5 5.7
Table 3 reveals that in the average round, DM payoffs are rather homogeneous,
but CM payoffs are not. When we account for repetition of the game and dis-
counting, this pattern remains. In DM player 2 earns the least as he acts as an
intermediary buying and transporting good 1, and consuming with a delay—which
is why discounting with β matters. His counterparts either do not travel (player 1),
or trade just for their consumption good (player 3), and since transport costs are
small their payoff differences are also small. In CM, instead, player 1 earns much less
than everyone else because he constantly travels with good 2, which is expensive to
carry. As a result, player 1 prefers DM to CM, contrary to his counterparts: players
2 and 3 double their earnings compared to DM because they always consume and
have no or tiny travel costs. Hence, though all players benefit from coordinating on
some equilibrium, and CM raises average payoffs by more than 40% (last column in
Table 3), their incentives are misaligned within a block of play.
Proposition 3. There are no trade patterns, equilibrium or not, that offer a Pareto-
improvement over either CM or DM.
The assumption u < c3 all but rules out travel with good 3, which is unprof-
itable. Hence, CM uniquely supports trilateral exchange. It should be clear that
since CM maximizes average payoffs, no other bilateral trade pattern (or mix of
patterns) exists that Pareto-dominates CM or DM. Indeed, any bilateral exchange
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other than DM involves travel with some good other than 1, which raises transport
costs but cannot increase consumption frequencies; it simply reallocates travel costs
and timing of consumption across players. This implies that some player would
surely dislike moving away from DM into some other bilateral trade pattern.4
Additional considerations: A design with multiple blocks, each with fixed rounds
and random termination thereafter, strikes a balance between the desire to facilitate
coordination on some equilibrium and to avoid a bias in favor of synchronous one-
round exchange. Running multiple rounds in a block facilitates learning to play some
equilibrium, but assuming a fixed number of rounds has the drawback of potentially
biasing the experiment against a multi-round asynchronous trade pattern because
the presence of an approaching final round might cause this trade pattern to unravel
(Kovenock and De Vries, 2002). Hence, we use random termination from round six,
so that after each round of play subjects anticipate an average of three additional
rounds, which is enough to support DM in every round, including round six. This
fixed plus random procedure has worked well in related experiments (Bigoni et al.,
forth.). Running multiple blocks facilitates re-coordination on equilibrium because
in each new block we re-initialized the distribution of endowments. To further
facilitate coordination subjects could observe the distribution of goods and realized
outcomes in their group, and could keep a manual record of outcomes as they were
endowed with pencil and paper. If a trade failed in a trilateral meeting subjects
were informed about the reason for failure (lack of goods or of mutual consent),
though they could not directly observe the trade choices of others.
4.1 Hypotheses
The aim of the experiment is to develop a better understanding of the principles
underlying the theory of money, not to reproduce and test a specific monetary
4Moving away from CM or DM neither offers a Pareto-improvement (someone is better off and
others are not harmed) nor improves average payoffs (some player may be worse off but average
surplus increases). Non-equilibrium strategies such as “always trade” cannot raise average payoffs.
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model. We thus formulate testable hypotheses when the mapping between theory
and design is sufficiently tight, and otherwise conduct a more exploratory analysis.
Based on the considerations expressed above, our working hypothesis is that
subjects should coordinate either on DM or on CM equilibrium. Although CM
maximizes average payoffs, the incentives are misaligned across players: player 1
earns more under DM, while players 2 and 3 under CM. Hence, there is no obvious
reason to expect that an outcome will prevail over the other in the experiment. We
thus turn to monetary theory to guide us in formulating a prediction.
As noted earlier, a central idea in that literature is that individuals naturally
(and tacitly) coordinate on efficient play. This suggests that monetary exchange
should not emerge unless it is “essential” to push forward the efficiency frontier.
Although the literature has yet to isolate a set of sufficient conditions for supporting
such an essentiality property, a basic ingredient is the assumption of a matching
friction that precludes interaction within small groups of fixed counterparts. Put
simply, this undermines coordination on non-monetary trading conventions that can
improve overall efficiency (Aliprantis et al., 2007). Because this friction is absent in
Baseline, we put forward a first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: In Baseline, CM emerges and prevails over DM trade.
In the two Rematch treatments, we randomly regroup players with each new block,
so partnerships periodically break down during the session. In Large, we scale up
the interaction group beyond three players and randomly allocate travelers to islands
of the desired type; here, players meet random counterparts in each round of the
session and cannot identify counterparts from previous meetings. These matching
frictions not only preclude interaction within a small group of fixed counterparts—
albeit to different degrees—but they also impair coordination through tacit means.
Empirical evidence suggests that a reason for adopting monetary exchange is that
it helps to overcome coordination problems (Camera and Casari, 2014). We thus
put forward a second hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 2: The frequency of CM trade declines, and DM rises, with group
rematching and random meetings as compared to fixed groups of three players.
Another theme in the monetary literature is that production specialization encour-
ages monetary exchange, while diversification discourages it. Specialization takes
the form of fixed player types who can only produce a single good (Kiyotaki and
Wright, 1989), while diversification allows players to increase their production va-
riety at a cost (Camera et al., 2003; Kiyotaki and Wright, 1993). Type rotation is
a form of diversification because it relaxes the extreme specialization assumption of
fixed types. Yet, rotation does not enable barter, which is unlike what diversifica-
tion does in models of money. It follows that according to monetary theory rotation
should be inconsequential—we should expect CM much as in Baseline because
it is the socially efficient arrangement. However, a distinct mechanism could be
operational in our design: individuals care about equality in outcomes (e.g., Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Rabin, 1993), a consideration that
is absent from standard monetary theory. Table 3 reveals that DM grants similar
payoffs in the average round (5.5. vs. 6 points), while CM implies large payoff
differences (2 vs. 12 points), which can make DM more attractive with fixed types.
Adding rotation can re-align the incentives across players by smoothing out payoff
differences over the entire session. Under DM the payoff in the average round of the
session is 5.7 points, while it is 8.3 points under CM (see Table 3). If subjects are
averse to inequality, then adding type rotation may enhance the attractiveness of
CM equilibrium relative to DM. Hence, we formulate a third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The frequency of CM trade rises, and DM declines, with rotation
as opposed to fixed players’ types.
5 Results
We start with an aggregate view, focusing on how subjects planned their meetings
in the five main treatments of the experiment, which consist of the Baseline design
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and the four treatment manipulations Baseline-R, Rematch, Rematch-R and
Large. This is done by studying the combined travel choices in an interaction
group, and evaluating their conformity to either CM or DM equilibrium. We then
move on to an individual-level analysis of outcomes in meetings.
5.1 Aggregate analysis
We develop two indicators of equilibrium play, denoted CM and DM, constructed
as follows. In a three-player group CM=1 in a round if the combined travel choices
support a trilateral CM meeting as in Fig. 3, and 0 otherwise; DM is similarly
coded following Fig. 2. These values are then averaged across all rounds of a block
so both CM and DM range from 0, when no meeting in any round conforms to
equilibrium play, to 1 when there is full conformity. Each indicator is aggregated at
the economy level, which is the unit of observation in this section.5
Result 1. Overall, CM and DM play organize a majority of the data.
Fig. 4 shows CM and DM meetings in the average round of a block. In the
average block, the value of the sum CM+DM lies between 0.61 and 0.78, suggesting
that the theory in Section 4 organizes the data well; the median sum is significantly
above 0.50 in every treatment (sign tests, the largest p-value is 0.062). Fig. 4
gives the impression that coordination on equilibrium was not easy, as CM+DM is
below 1 in every treatment, even in later blocks. Furthermore, neither CM nor DM
appear to drop to zero over time, suggesting a lack of focality except, perhaps, for
the Baseline treatment. This supports our working hypothesis.
5In Large, CM and DM measure the maximum fraction of CM and DM meetings possible in the
round (realized meetings may be less, due to the random allocation of players). In rematching
treatments, we average CM and DM across the economy’s groups. The Supplementary Informa-
tion provides details on these calculations; Fig. A.1 shows the frequency of other possible meeting
patterns, and reveals that travel between islands 1 and 3, and travel with good 3 is negligible.
20
Figure 4: Coordination on CM and DM meetings in the average round.
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Notes: One obs.=one economy in a block (N=13 in each block for Baseline and Baseline-R;
N=7 in blocks 1-3 and N=6 in blocks 4-6 for Rematch; N=7 in blocks 1-4 and N=6 in blocks 5-6
in Rematch-R; N=9,8,8,5,4,3 in blocks 1-6 in Large). CM = relative frequency of coordination
on CM meetings in a round; DM = relative frequency of coordination on DM meetings in a round.
Figure 5: Coordination on CM and DM meetings in an entire block.
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Notes: One obs.=one economy in a block. FullCM = share of groups within the economy that
coordinated on CM meetings in every round of the block; FullDM = share of groups within the
economy that coordinated on DM meetings in every round of the block.
A more stringent way to assess coordination on equilibrium is to measure how
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frequently an economy coordinated on some equilibrium in an entire block. Fig. 5
displays behavior in line with either equilibrium for an entire block. In a three-player
group FullCM=1 in a block if the combined travel choices support trilateral CM
meetings in every round of the block, and 0 otherwise; FullDM is coded accordingly.
Coordination on an equilibrium for the entire block is clearly much more challenging.
None of the Large economies coordinated on an equilibrium in the entire block. In
the remaining treatments, in the average block the sum of values FullCM+FullDM
lies between 0.18 and 0.38. Again we see a lack of focality of either equilibrium,
except for the Baseline treatment.
Result 2. In Baseline, DM trade prevailed over CM trade from the beginning of
the session.
Fig. 4 and Table 4 provide support. Baseline exhibits the smallest frequency
of CM meetings, and the largest frequency of DM meetings of all treatments. Sub-
jects coordinated on DM equilibrium from the beginning of the session, and the
frequency of DM play increased as subjects gained experience with the task. Con-
versely, CM equilibrium play is infrequent and does not increase with experience (see
Fig. 4, right panel). Decentralized monetary trade prevailed over centralized trade;
overall, the mean values of CM and DM are 0.10 and 0.61, a significant difference
(p-value<0.001, N1=N2=13).6 Based on this evidence, Hypothesis 1 is rejected.
As we have few independent observations, we also ran panel regressions using
an economy in a block as the unit of observation; these offer additional supporting
evidence for Result 2. The panel structure is suitable in our case because one
economy gives rise to an independent sequence of observations. As we pooled data
from all main treatments, we use a categorical variable to estimate treatment effects,
with Baseline corresponding to the base of the regression. We also include a
6Unless otherwise noted, all statistical tests in this section use an economy as the unit of observation
(No. of obs. in notes to Fig. 4 and in Table A.1 in the Supplementary Information) and two-sided
Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney ranksum tests with exact statistics.
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continuous Block regressor interacted with the treatment variables to determine
how experience with the task affected behavior across the various treatments. A set
of additional controls soaks up the effect of economy size, gender composition, and
duration of the block—current and previous.
In column 1 of Table 4 the dependent variable is the frequency of CM. The
intercept is close to and statistically indistinguishable from zero. Instead in column
2, where DM is the dependent variable, the intercept term is positive and highly
significant. This is evidence that subjects initially coordinated on DM equilibrium
and not on CM. The estimated coefficients of the learning covariates indicate that in
Baseline subjects learned to play DM equilibrium as they gained experience with
the task; the coefficient on the Block regressor is positive and significant in (2) and
insignificant in (1). Again, this allows us to reject Hypothesis 1.
The prevalence of DM trade is also observed when we manipulate the baseline
design by introducing matching frictions. However, when production types rotate
we find that CM trade partially crowded out DM trade.
Result 3. Subjects learned to coordinate on some equilibrium: CM with type rota-
tion, and DM otherwise.
Fig, 4-5 and the panel regressions in Table 4 offer evidence. Using Fig. 4 to
visually compare the treatment manipulations to the fixed three-person group design
of Baseline suggests two considerations. First, adding matching frictions does not
alter the prevalence of DM trade, although DM declines and CM increases, especially
initially in Large (right panel). In Rematch and Large, the mean values are
CM=0.20, 0.27 and DM=0.50, 0.51, respectively; we can reject the hypothesis that
DM and CM are statistically similar (p-values 0.07 and 0.010, respectively). Second,
trade patterns shifted from DM monetary to CM non-monetary trade when we added
type rotation, although neither equilibrium seems to prevail (left panel). Overall, the
treatments with type rotation, Baseline-R and Rematch-R, exhibit the largest
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average frequency of CM meetings, 0.31 and 0.30, and about half as much DM
meetings as compared to Baseline, 0.37 and 0.31; within each treatment with type
rotation we cannot reject the hypothesis that CM and DM are statistically similar,
suggesting that neither equilibrium was particularly salient.
Considering cross-treatment comparisons, we can reject the hypothesis that CM
is statistically similar in Baseline and any of the other treatments (5% level or bet-
ter). We can also reject the hypothesis that DM is statistically similar in Rematch-
R as compared to Rematch and Large (10% level or better). No other treatment
comparison reveals a significant difference. This is an initial indication that trade
patterns shifted from decentralized to centralized markets when we added type ro-
tation; hence, Hypothesis 3 cannot be rejected. Moreover there is also evidence
that the random re-matching friction in Large led to more CM trade (but similar
DM trade) as compared to Baseline, while the differences between Baseline and
Rematch are insignificant; hence, Hypothesis 2 can be rejected.
To assess how the treatment manipulations affected initial vs. long-run play, con-
sider the regressions in Table 4. The intercept terms allow us to assess treatment
effects of play of inexperienced subjects. Introducing rematching or type rotation
caused an initial shift away from DM towards CM trade as compared to Baseline;
in column 2, all coefficients on the treatment dummies are negative and significant
(Wald tests reveal that they are statistically similar), while in column 1, all coeffi-
cients on the treatment dummies are positive, although only Large is significant.
Again, this is in contrast with Hypothesis 2.
Yet, the estimated coefficients of the learning covariates indicate that this ef-
fect is short-lived in all treatments with fixed types: as subjects gained experience
with the task, they learned to play DM equilibrium much as it happens in Base-
line. Periodically breaking up partnerships through random re-rematching in each
block did not alter the learning trend observed in Baseline (the coefficients on
Rematch×Block are insignificant), while constant random re-matching strengthened
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it (the coefficient on Large×Block is positive and significant in (2)).7
Table 4: CM and DM meetings and efficiency: panel regression
Dep. var. (1) CM (2) DM (3) Efficiency
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Treatment
Baseline-R 0.058 (0.063) -0.199** (0.083) -0.245 (0.196)
Rematch 0.079 (0.074) -0.204** (0.099) -0.208 (0.156)
Rematch-R 0.073 (0.057) -0.230** (0.103) -0.175 (0.127)
Large 0.268*** (0.067) -0.203* (0.106) -0.096 (0.153)
Learning covariates
Block 0.008 (0.012) 0.030*** (0.006) 0.067*** (0.010)
Baseline-R×Block 0.040* (0.022) -0.009 (0.017) 0.056 (0.038)
Rematch×Block 0.011 (0.025) 0.018 (0.017) 0.020 (0.022)
Rematch-R×Block 0.041* (0.023) -0.030** (0.013) 0.021 (0.020)
Large×Block -0.023 (0.021) 0.016** (0.007) -0.016 (0.018)
Economy size -0.006 (0.034) 0.049 (0.034) 0.058* (0.035)
Constant 0.066 (0.042) 0.538*** (0.085) 0.218** (0.103)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
N 272 272 272
R2 within 0.105 0.095 0.262
R2 between 0.160 0.170 0.084
R2 overall 0.133 0.153 0.186
Notes: Panel regressions with random effects. One observation = one economy in a block. CM
= relative frequency of coordination on CM meetings in the average round of the block; DM =
relative frequency of coordination on DM meetings in the average round of the block. Efficiency
= per-capita profit in the average round of the block, divided by the maximum per-capita profit
(the profit from CM trade). Controls include standardized measures of block duration, current
and previous (set to 9 rounds, in block 1), and gender composition in the economy (self-reported).
Robust standard errors (S.E.) adjusted for clustering at the session level. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and
∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Instead, with type rotation, subjects learned to play CM. The coefficients on
Baseline-R×Block and Rematch-R×Block are positive and significant in (1); they
are similar (Wald test), suggesting that rematching by itself did not diminish the
impact of rotation on learning to play CM equilibrium. Neither Baseline-R×Block
7In all treatments there is a significant upward trend in equilibrium play, CM or DM, also evidence
of convergence to an equilibrium. Evidence comes from a panel regression where the dependent
variable is the sum CM + DM. In Table A.2 in Supplementary Information, the coefficient on
the Block regressor is positive and highly significant; we can reject the hypothesis that Block +
treatment × Block=0 in all other treatment manipulations.
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nor the sum of Block + Rematch-R×Block are different than zero in (2). Because
subjects benefit from learning to coordinate on some equilibrium, we also see that
individual payoffs and, therefore, efficiency grow over time in all treatments. This
is seen in column (3) of Table 4 (Wald tests reveal that the sum of Block and the
relevant interaction covariate is significantly different than zero for each treatment).8
The evidence that introducing type rotation instead of fixed types caused a shift
from DM to CM trade is clearly in line with Hypothesis 3. However, the obser-
vation that when we added a random rematching friction DM initially declined is
in contrast with Hypothesis 2. Again, a more stringent way to assess coordination
on equilibrium in the various treatments is to measure how frequently an economy
coordinated on some equilibrium in an entire block. Data are reported in Fig. 5.
Three observations stand out. First, coordination in an entire block is most fre-
quently attained in Baseline, followed by the rotation treatments and Rematch,
while it is never observed in large groups. This pattern is intuitive considering that
the environment becomes progressively less stable: we go from small groups of part-
ners and fixed roles (baseline), to one where roles switch in each block (rotation),
to one in which counterparts switch in each block (rematching), to one with many
counterparts that switch in each round (large). Second, in treatments with three-
person groups the lines in Fig. 5 exhibit a positive trend, suggesting that as subjects
gained experience with the task, they learned to coordinate on an equilibrium for
the entire block. Third, FullDM increases over time in Baseline, and FullCM in
rotation treatments, suggesting that if an equilibrium was attained in a block, then
it remained stable; the pattern is less clear in Rematch.9
8Realized efficiency is the aggregate payoff observed in an economy, divided by the maximum
theoretical payoff (the CM payoff). The efficiency in block 1 was .22, -.06, .04, -.02, .18, and it
increased to .54, .65, .51, .51, .50 in block 6 for, respectively, Baseline, Baseline-R, Rematch,
Rematch-R and Large. See Fig. A.2 in the Supplementary Information.
9We ran two-sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney ranksum test with exact statistics. The independent
unit of observation is the frequency of coordination on CM and DM in all periods of the block,
in the average group of an economy, in a session. FullCM and FullDM are significantly differ-
ent in Baseline (p-value=0.027, N1=N2=13), Baseline-R (p-value=0.078, N1=N2=13) and
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Summing up: subjects learned to coordinate either on CM or DM equilibrium
in the experiment. DM prevailed over socially efficient CM in all treatments with
fixed types; with type rotation centralized non-monetary trade emerged and crowded
out decentralized monetary trade. This last observation is consistent with the pre-
dictions of standard monetary theory—CM should emerge because it is socially
efficient—but the former is not. The fact that monetary trade emerged in the fric-
tionless baseline design is in contrast with the theory; the initial decline in DM
trade when we added meeting frictions is also unexpected. Yet, the prevalence of
monetary trade is consistent with possible concerns about equality in outcomes—a
consideration that is absent from monetary theory. The large payoff differences of
CM trade may become acceptable when players anticipate that rotation will smooth
these differences out over the course of the session. To sharpen this aggregate anal-
ysis of meeting choices, we study outcomes for the pivotal player 2, who is the only
one who in every equilibrium trades in every round, and trades with everyone else.
5.2 Individual-level analysis
To start, we consider what good players 2 acquired when they traded. This provides
direct evidence about the organization of trade, which complements the indirect
evidence from analysis of planned meetings at the aggregate level.
Result 4. In treatments with fixed types, player 2 more frequently traded his pro-
duction good for good 1 than good 2, but switched to trading for good 2 when types
rotated.
Evidence comes from the multinomial logit regression in Table 5. One obser-
vation is one player 2 in a round in which trilateral and bilateral trade were both
feasible, unconditional on travel decisions. This means that all three good types
must be available in the interaction group, so DM and CM equilibrium are both fea-
Rematch-R (p-value=0.036, N1=N2=7), but not Rematch (p-value=0.323, N1=N2=7).
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sible in the round. Given this feasibility requirement, the outcome depends on the
travel and trading choices of all players. For example, CM is enabled only if player
1 chooses to visit island 2. The outcome variable takes one of three possible values
associated with the mutually exclusive cases of “no trade” (0), “trades for good 1”
(1) and “trades for good 2” (2). We separately consider the initial three and the
last three blocks to isolate the treatment effect on play of (in)experienced subjects.
We include treatment dummies that are interacted with the block regressor, and
standard controls. The dummy Random termination soaks up the effect of random
termination starting in round 6. Finally, since in Large we scale up the group, the
continuous variable CM feasibility captures the number of trilateral exchanges that
are feasible, based on the goods available overall in the group (ranging from 1, if
everyone has their production good, to 0, if some good type is missing).
In Baseline the estimated probabilities that player 2 does not trade are .22
(blocks 1-3) and .23 (blocks 4-6); the probabilities that she bilaterally trades her
production (good 3) for the medium of exchange (good 1) are .57 and .53; and she
trilaterally trades and gets her consumption good 2 with probabilities .21 and .24.
This corroborates the earlier evidence that DM is prevalent in Baseline.
Rematching did not alter this pattern. The marginal effects of Rematch on the
probabilities of trading for good 1 or 2 are insignificant. The scaling up of groups
and random rematching introduced in Large initially significantly decreased the
frequency of DM trade relative to Baseline, while raising CM and the incidence of
trade; however, there are no significant differences later in the session (see the coef-
ficient on Large). This evidence is again in contrast with Hypothesis 2. Conversely,
type rotation led to the emergence of centralized markets and coordination on CM
trade. In blocks 4-6, the coefficients on the Baseline-R and Rematch-R dummies
reveal that the probability of engaging in CM trade increased by 43 and 36 percent-
age points, respectively, relative to Baseline; the coefficients are significant and
similarly large (Wald tests). This is evidence that adding rotation increased CM
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trade, even if we added rematching; this is in line with Hypothesis 3.
Table 5: Outcomes for player 2: marginal effects
(1) Blocks 1-3 (2) Blocks 4-6
Good traded none 1 2 none 1 2
Treatments
Baseline-R 0.147** -0.332*** 0.185* -0.094 -0.335*** 0.429***
(0.074) (0.087) (0.108) (0.125) (0.077) (0.150)
Rematch 0.227** -0.212 -0.015 0.081 -0.153 0.072
(0.103) (0.139) (0.099) (0.149) (0.155) (0.171)
Rematch-R 0.128* -0.360*** 0.232** -0.019 -0.338*** 0.357**
(0.067) (0.101) (0.097) (0.119) (0.130) (0.180)
Large 0.216** -0.418*** 0.202** 0.018 -0.123 0.104
(0.086) (0.106) (0.095) (0.139) (0.130) (0.161)
Block -0.068*** 0.035 0.034 -0.043 0.025** 0.019
(0.018) (0.047) (0.046) (0.028) (0.012) (0.025)
Rand. Term. -0.018 0.008 0.010 0.004 -0.001 -0.003
(0.017) (0.023) (0.016) (0.026) (0.030) (0.024)
CM Feas. 0.171 -0.026 -0.145 0.095 0.368 -0.463
(0.107) (0.238) (0.162) (0.179) (0.231) (0.293)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Multinomial logit regressions on the three outcomes for player 2: 0 (does not trade), 1
(trades for good 1), and 2 (trades for good 2). One obs. = player 2 in a round (N=2654 for blocks 1-
3 and N=1478 for blocks 4-6). Only rounds in which both CM and DM are feasible. CM feasibility
is 1 in all three-player groups, while in Large where the interaction group is a multiple of three,
it measures the maximum number of trilateral meetings that can be formed, given the available
goods. Random termination = 1 for rounds 6 and above (0, otherwise). Controls include the size
of the economy, and gender composition in the economy (self-reported). Robust standard errors
(S.E.) adjusted for clustering at the session level. Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at
the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
From a more exploratory perspective, the regression also provides individual-
level evidence about coordination on equilibrium. Theoretically, player 2 should
trade in all rounds, in both CM and DM, and in all treatments. While this is not
what we observe, we do find that trade is frequent and increases with experience.10
This corroborates the earlier finding that subjects learned to play some equilibrium
10The probabilities that player 2 trades in a round (not necessarily an equilibrium trade) in Base-
line, Baseline-R, Rematch, Rematch-R and Large are, respectively, .69, .51, .58, .58, and
.66 in blocks 1-3, and they all increase to .80, .77, .68, .71 and .83 in blocks 4-6.
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over the course of the session. Moving away from groups of three partners with
fixed roles, however, increased coordination difficulties (the treatment dummies for
the “no trade” outcome are all positive and significant in blocks 1-3) and created
instability in trading choices.
Result 5. Equilibrium is more stable in Baseline than in all other treatments.
A group coordinates on CM (DM) equilibrium in a round, if player 2 trilaterally
(bilaterally) trades in conformity with CM (DM). Hence, to investigate stability of
equilibrium across treatments we study the frequency distribution of equilibrium
breakdowns experienced by player 2, reported in Table 6. Overall, equilibrium
classifies about 2/3 of player 2’s outcomes. An equilibrium breaks down when it is
observed in round t but not in t+1; the frequencies of breakdowns are in parentheses.
Table 6: Equilibrium play and breakdowns in a round
CM trade DM trade Other N
Baseline 69 (14) 427 (27) 210 706
Baseline-R 206 (16) 182 (44) 245 633
Rematch 125 (32) 471 (98) 471 1067
Rematch-R 313 (29) 295 (82) 433 1041
Large 453 (253) 748 (197) 613 1814
Notes: One observation = player 2 in a round. CM (DM) trade = player 2 engages in CM (DM)
trade; Other = player 2 neither attained CM nor DM trade; N= number of obs.. In parentheses
the frequency of equilibrium breakdowns in the subsequent round.
The first logit regression in Table 7 tests for stability differentials across treat-
ments by considering data from all rounds that followed either CM or DM equi-
librium play. The dependent variable takes value 1 if the equilibrium broke down,
and 0 otherwise. The coefficients on the treatment dummies are all positive and
significant. Moreover, the coefficient on Large is significantly bigger than all others
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(Wald tests, p-values at or above 5% level), while all other treatment coefficients
are statistically similar (Wald tests).
Table 7: Equilibrium breakdowns and trade failures: marginal effects
Dep Var. =1 if: (1) Eq’m breakdown (2) 2 avoids DM trade
Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E.
Treatments
Baseline-R 0.099* (0.058) 0.198*** (0.054)
Rematch 0.178*** (0.058) 0.227*** (0.080)
Rematch-R 0.131*** (0.039) 0.215*** (0.082)
Large 0.334*** (0.056) 0.213** (0.093)
Block -0.029* (0.017) -0.008 (0.013)
Random termination -0.025** (0.012) -0.014 (0.011)
Controls Yes Yes
N 2936 3267
Notes: Logit regressions. One obs. = player 2 in one round. Left regression: Dep. var. = 1
if the equilibrium broke down (else, 0); includes only rounds following equilibrium play. Right
regression: dep. var. = 1 if there is no DM trade (else, 0); includes only rounds in which player
2 is either in a DM meeting with 3, or holds good 1. Random termination = 1 for rounds 6 and
above (0, otherwise). Controls include size of the economy, and gender (self-reported). Robust
standard errors (S.E.) adjusted for clustering at the session level. Symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
It is not surprising that breakdowns are more common in large groups, partly due
to involuntary failures (random meetings).11 But what explains the breakdowns with
rematching and rotation? Apart from error, breakdowns may stem from players’
conflicting incentives: DM offers better prospects to player 1, who may push for
it by avoiding island 2. In fact, player 1 is the one who selects which equilibrium
the group can achieve; by avoiding island 2 she prevents CM equilibrium. But
“assertive” players 2 may signal their commitment to CM, by either refusing good
11If we augment the notion of stability by considering transitions from one block to the next,
instead of one round to the next, we have a similar picture. Full coordination never occurred in
large groups, Baseline exhibits the greatest coordination (on DM), which is also quite stable.
Miscoordination was especially common under rematching and rotation.
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1 or refusing to travel with it. Players 2 can easily develop a reputation for being
assertive in small groups of fixed partners, but not so easily if types rotate, and
especially if counterparts randomly change across blocks or rounds. In this case,
the player must repeatedly derail a monetary trade to signal his “type.” If so, DM
trades should fail less in Baseline than in other treatments.
The data confirm the intuition about the source of trade failures. Consider all
observations while excluding those from Large where trade failures are also caused
by random allocation to islands. Player 2 held good 3 in 2503 rounds and good 1
in 944 rounds. When player 2 held his own production, player 1 visited island 2
only 33% of times, vs. 77% for player 3. Player 1 is thus the main cause of CM
breakdowns. There are 91 cases of CM breakdowns: in 84 of these player 1 did not
visit island 2. Player 2 often took this deviation in stride, bilaterally trading with
player 3 in about half of the cases. However, player 2 was also assertive in signaling
a desire for CM. There are 251 cases of DM breakdowns: in 159 of these player
2 held good 1 and in the others good 3. Conditional on holding good 1, player 2
refused to visit island 1 in 60% of cases. Conditional on holding good 3 and meeting
type 3, player 2 refused to trade in about 36% of cases (N=49).
We also find that players 2 were the least likely to derail a DM trade in Baseline.
The second regression in Table 7, considers all rounds in which player 2 had the
opportunity to complete a DM trade; the dependent variable takes value 1 if player
2 derailed the trade (0 otherwise). The coefficients on the treatment dummies are
all positive and significant, which helps explain why making interactions impersonal
through rematching and random meetings frictions failed to boost DM as predicted
by the monetary literature: these manipulations reinforced coordination problems
among players whose incentives were already misaligned.
But if this is the explanation, why did rotation—which also increased coordina-
tion frictions—lead to the emergence of centralized markets, even when we randomly
rematched subjects? And why did the baseline setup without matching frictions con-
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verge to DM trade instead of to the socially efficient CM trade as monetary theory
would suggest? Finally, how would the organization of trade be affected in the
presence of bilateral barter or bilateral fiat monetary exchange? We tackle these
questions through four additional treatments.12
5.3 Four additional treatments
Given the results of the main treatments, we carry out an exploratory analysis about
the role of strategic uncertainty, of payoff inequality, and the effect of competition
with barter and fiat monetary exchange.
We start by expanding upon Result 1, which is in contrast with Hypothesis 1.
Aversion to inequality is a possible explanation. In the average round DM grants
similar payoffs (6, 5.5 and 5.5 points) while CM does not (2, 12 and 11 points).
Inequality-averse subjects would naturally focus on DM, and avoid CM. Strategic
uncertainty is another possible reason for the dominance of DM in Baseline; with
fixed types, players’ incentives are conflicting and individuals might be uncertain
what equilibrium others will choose. This especially matters to player 1, who earns
a meager payoff under CM and might wish to “push” for DM by avoiding island 2.
This choice is risky as player 1 foregoes a trilateral trade, but player 2 may refuse
to accept good 1. We show that player 1 would want to take this kind of risk.
The role of strategic uncertainty. Given that our game is asymmetric, does
not have a two-by-two structure, and admits more than two equilibria we consider a
notion of risk dominance that departs from the formalization in Harsanyi and Selten
(1988), but conforms to the heuristic argument that motivates it.13 In particular,
we focus on player 1 because she selects which equilibrium the group can achieve;
12We thank anonymous referees for suggesting an extended line of inquiry.
13It is close to the formulation in Haruvy and Stahl (2004) and Fehr et al. (2018) where the risk-
dominant equilibrium maximizes the expected payoff when players have uniformly distributed
second order beliefs on all equilibria. Bigoni et al. (forth.) consider a reduced game with only
two equilibria (efficient and inefficient) that players believe others select with equal probability.
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by avoiding island 2, she precludes CM equilibrium. The problem is that she is
uncertain what strategy player 2 will select. We assume that player 1 believes that
player 2 is equally likely to select either CM or DM, and believes that player 2 has
similar beliefs about her own strategy selection. To develop the argument, note
that there is neither uncertainty over the initial travel choices of players 2 and 3
(in both equilibria they choose island 2) nor the trade choice of player 3 (she only
accepts good 3 in both equilibria). The uncertainty is all about player 2’s choice:
will she accept good 1? Suppose player 1 believes this to be a coin toss (principle of
insufficient reason). Her dilemma is: travel to island 2 to coordinate on CM, or stay
home and see if player 2 accepts good 1. At the end of the round, the uncertainty is
resolved, so players can coordinate on DM if good 1 is traded, and on CM otherwise.
We say that DM is risk dominant for player 1 if it delivers a greater expected payoff
than the payoff earned from choosing CM, which is w1 =
u− c2
1− β . Given this notion
of risk-dominance we have the following result:
Proposition 4. In Baseline, DM is risk-dominant.
The expected payoff to player 1 from staying home is 12v1 +
1
2βw1 where v1 =
βu
1− β2 is the equilibrium payoff in the initial round of DM trade. Player 1 neither
consumes nor produces, and expects CM or DM with equal probability from next
round. Given the parameterization in Baseline we have w1 < 12v1 +
1
2βw1.
Two of three players prefer CM to DM trade. If strategic uncertainty is what
supports DM trade, adding a coordination-enhancing institution should cause a shift
from DM to CM trade since all players benefit from avoiding mis-coordination. To
test this hypothesis we ran the Chat treatment, which adds costless pre-play free-
form communication at the start of each block of Baseline. This allows us to
investigate the role of coordination frictions because it neither removes equilibria,
nor resolves the problem of conflicting incentives. Adding pre-play communication
can mitigate strategic uncertainty since subjects can coordinate their actions.
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The right hand side of Fig. 6 reports the frequency of CM and DM in the average
economy of Baseline vs. Chat. There is a sharp equilibrium reversal, supporting
the view that strategic uncertainty played a role in the adoption of DM. CM trade
jumped from 0.10 to 0.54, while DM trade sharply declined from 0.61 to 0.27; both
differences are significant (two sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney ranksum test with
exact statistics; for CM, p-value=0.004, N1=13, N2=12; for DM p-value=0.012,
N1=13, N2=12). A regression similar to the one in Table 5 confirms the significance
of these non-parametric results (see Table A.3 in Supplementary Information).
Figure 6: The Chat and No CM vs. Baseline and Baseline-R treatments
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Notes: One obs.=one economy in a block (N=13 in each block for Baseline and Baseline-R;
N=12 in each block for Chat; N=9 in each block for No CM). CM = frequency of CM meetings;
DM = frequency of DM meetings.
It is also conceivable that pre-play communication affected inequality concerns,
reducing subjects’ inclination to seek DM as a way to attain more balanced payoffs.
Indeed, we have seen that by adding rotation to the frictionless Baseline treatment,
CM emerged and crowded out DM trade. We discuss this next.
The role of the payoffs distribution. In treatments with type rotation ev-
eryone experiences each role twice in the session. This removes the large payoff
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differences of CM trade if players coordinate on CM in the entire session; the payoff
in the average round of the session is simply the payoff of the average player. This
average is 45% larger under CM than DM (see Table 3). Rotation can thus make
CM more attractive because it re-aligns the incentives across players dynamically,
by equalizing the distribution of payoffs over the entire session. This, we argued in
Section 4.1, is a further reason why CM might emerge under rotation but not under
fixed types. We tested this hypothesis through a logit regression similar to the one
reported in the previous section, focusing on the initial travel decisions of players 1
(round 1 in a block). If rotation enhances the attractiveness of CM relative to DM,
then it should remove the incentive for player 1 to push for DM in that first round.
If so, then we should observe more travel from the get go—even when we add a
rematching friction. Indeed, there is a statistically significant increase in the proba-
bility of travel in Baseline-R as compared to Baseline, and in Rematching-R
vs. Rematching (see Table A.4 in Supplementary Information).
An alternative hypothesis is that rotation supported CM simply because sub-
jects misunderstood the structure of economic incentives—switching types might
have confused them. For example, subjects sought outcomes that maximize the
sum of payoffs in the entire session, even if some player could personally gain from
acting differently than that outcome. To assess this possibility we modified the
Baseline-R design—where subjects learned to coordinate on CM trade—removing
CM from the equilibrium set. The No CM treatment raises the cost c2 from 10 to
15 points, on par with c3. Here any trilateral trade is unprofitable for at least one
player; in particular, player 1 has a 3 points loss under CM, although CM ensures
7 points to the average player, which is 1.3 points above the average payoff in DM
(which remains an equilibrium). If rotation alters subjects’ understanding of the
economic incentives, then we should still observe some trilateral trades. The left
hand side of Fig. 6 reports the frequency of CM and DM in Baseline-R vs. No
CM for an economy. The average CM significantly drops from 0.31 to 0.01, while
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DM trade significantly rises from 0.37 to 0.64 (two sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney
ranksum test with exact statistics; for CM p-value=0.004, N1=13, N2=9; for DM
p-value=0.014, N1=13, N2=9).14 We summarize these findings as follows.
Result 6. Introducing costless pre-play communication caused a shift from DM to
CM trade. Adding rotation induced player 1 to more frequently enable CM at the
start of the game. Raising c2 to c3 caused a shift from CM to DM trade.
The role of barter. The monetary literature emphasizes that decentralized mon-
etary exchange spontaneously emerges as an optimal response to the inefficiency of
diversification and barter trade, and the impossibility of centralized exchange (Cam-
era et al., 2003). Earlier, we added type rotation as a way to relax the extreme form
of specialization typical of monetary models, and argued that this alternation in eco-
nomic tasks re-aligns the incentives across players thus explaining Result 3. Though
rotation can be seen as a form of diversification (less specialization), this explanation
is distinct from the usual one in monetary theory for why diversification weakens
DM. There, diversification enables barter, while in our rotation treatments it does
not. To investigate the role of barter on the endogenous organization of trade, we
thus introduce the possibility to diversify production and then barter it. Adding
this option expands the equilibrium set because it supports barter equilibria that,
however, are not socially efficient.15 Here, centralized market trading should still
emerge because it still is socially efficient.
To test this intuition, we manipulate the Baseline-R design—where play con-
verged to CM—by allowing double coincidence meetings. In thisBarter treatment,
players can pay 2 points to produce the other good they cannot consume, instead of
their specialty good. If everyone produces their specialty good, then the probability
14One of the three No CM sessions was run without rotation to explore possible effects, but there
are none—these results hold without that session included.
15In models of money, bartering own production is simply unfeasible (Kiyotaki and Wright, 1989).
Conditional on being feasible, then barter equilibrium would be efficient, but not necessarily if
enabling barter is costly (Camera et al., 2003).
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of double coincidence is zero as in the original design. Otherwise, two producers
can barter, and three barter equilibria may arise. Under low-cost barter, player 2
produces good 1 (instead of 3) and barters it for 2 on island 1, so player 3 remains
idle. In another low-cost barter equilibrium, player 1 produces good 3 (instead of 2)
and barters it on island 1 for good 1, so player 2 never trades. In a high-cost barter
equilibrium, player 3 produces good 2 (instead of 1) and barters it for good 3 on
island 2, so player 1 never trades (see Fig. A.3 in Supplementary Information).
If barter occurs, then the distribution of payoffs across players is even more
unequal that under CM, since one player type does not consume. However, types
rotate from block to block in Barter, which smooths out the large payoff differences
of barter equilibrium over the entire session. For the low-cost and high-cost barter
equilibria, the expected payoffs in the average round of the session are, respectively,
wBL =
2u− c1 − 2
3(1− β) , and w
B
H =
2u− c2 − 2
3(1− β) .
CM and DM are still equilibria, and there is an explicit tradeoff between barter,
monetary trade, and centralized trade. DM generates smaller expected session pay-
offs than low-cost barter, and higher expected payoffs than high-cost barter. CM
is still socially efficient, i.e., w > wBL > v > wBH .16 Hence, though barter might
replace DM, according to the insights from the monetary literature, barter should
not crowd-out CM. Moreover, rotation also ensures equalization of the distribution
of CM payoffs over the entire session. In fact, the data reveal something different.
Result 7. The ability to adjust production and seek double coincidence meetings
gave rise to inefficient barter equilibria, which crowded out both CM and DM trade.
Fig. 7 shows that barter increased over time, DM declined, and CM was rare.
Considering the average economy in Baseline-R vs. Barter, the relative fre-
16The (normalized) expected CM payoff (1−β)w = 8.3, the low-cost barter payoff is (1−β)wBL = 7
and the high-cost barter payoff is (1− β)wBL = 4.
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quency of CM dropped from 0.31 to 0.02, while DM fell from 0.37 to 0.11; both
differences are statistically significant (two sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney ranksum
test with exact statistics; CM, p-value=0.002, N1=13, N2=12; DM, p-value=0.004,
N1=13, N2=12). By contrast the frequency of barter is 0.52.17 Of all barter trades,
only 4% were high-cost, while most (60%) involved players 1 and 2. As a result,
player 1 traded and consumed significantly more than in Baseline-R (Table A.5,
Supplementary Information). This reallocation of trade activity redistributed profit
away from player 3 to players 1 and 2 (panel regressions, data not reported).
Figure 7: Barter vs. Baseline-R
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Notes: One obs.=one economy in a block (N=13 in each block for Baseline-R; N=12 in each
block for Barter). CM = frequency of CM meetings; DM = frequency of DM meetings. Barter :
frequency of barter meetings.
The role of fiat money. In our experiment, monetary trade emerged that in-
volved a commodity. The focus on commodity money allows us to study centralized
vs. decentralized trading arrangements through a parsimonious design where we
do not need to add a fourth object that can serve as a medium of exchange. A
17This result is robust to making barter unattractive to one player by fixing types so if two players
coordinate on barter, the third earns nothing in the entire session. We ran one session with 3
economies (9 subjects) and found similar results as in the other sessions (with rotation); the
mean values are CM=0.07, DM=0.25, while barter trade=0.55.
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related experiment focuses on fiat money to study trading arrangements with fixed
vs. randomly changing counterparts when goods are non-storable (Bigoni et al.,
2018). The open question is whether fiat money trade would emerge if it competed
with storable goods serving as a money.
The Fiat treatment studies this case by building on Baseline, where DM was
the strongest. We add one intrinsically useless “good 0” (token) to player 2’s initial
endowment. The token is costless to transport and can be exchanged for the player’s
consumption good. This expands the strategy set, enabling fiat monetary trade
where tokens circulate from island to island, and goods never move. To give the best
chance for fiat money to arise in the limited session time, we minimized complexity
by simplifying the action space. Players could transport only one object, and spend
their token only to buy their consumption good away from their home island; those
who did not travel could only acquire a token by offering their production good.
This allows us to study the emergence of equilibria in which the token travels with
buyers (see the “shopping equilibria” in Goldberg, 2007).
Figure 8: Asynchronous decentralized fiat money trade
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With three players, fiat monetary exchange requires a three-round trading cy-
cle, as the token must circle all the way back to the initial spender (see Fig. 8).
By contrast, DM is based on a two-round trading cycle. This implies that if fiat
monetary exchange is an equilibrium, then it is Pareto-dominated by DM as the
longer trading cycle reduces the player’s payoff to 4 points for the average round, as
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compared to between 5.5 to 6 points in DM. The monetary literature asserts that
fiat monetary trade emerges to expand the efficiency frontier. If so, then we should
not observe any significant circulation of good 0, in the experiment.
Result 8. With tokens, fiat monetary trade emerged and partly crowded out DM
trade relative to Baseline.
Fig. 9 compares the average economy in Baseline to Fiat.
Figure 9: Fiat vs. Baseline
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Notes: One obs.=one economy in a block (N=13 in each block for Baseline; N=12 in each block
for Fiat). CM (DM) = frequency of CM (DM) meetings; Fiat trades: frequency of fiat meetings.
The relative frequency of CM remains similar at 0.10, while DM falls from 0.61
to 0.26; only the second difference is statistically significant (two sided Wilcoxon-
Mann Whitney ranksum test with exact statistics; CM, p-value=0.562, N1=13,
N2=12; DM, p-value=0.009, N1=13, N2=12). By contrast the relative frequency
of fiat monetary trade is 0.28, of which 0.06 are cases in which player 3 travels
with fiat money to island 2, 0.08 in which player 1 travels to island 3, and 0.14 for
player 2 travelling to island 1. As a result of the shift from DM to the less efficient
fiat monetary trade overall efficiency decreased (two sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney
ranksum test with exact statistics, p-value=0.086, N1=13, N2=12).
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In Fiat, using tokens as money did not dominate commodity money trade. The
relative frequency of CM is different from both DM and fiat trade, while DM and
fiat trade are similar (two sided Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney ranksum test with exact
statistics; CM vs DM, p-value=0.006; CM vs. Fiat, p-value=0.032; DM vs. Fiat,
p-value=0.620, N1=N2=12). Evidence of a shift from CM and DM to fiat monetary
trade also comes from a logit regression (not reported). Recall that player 2 trades
in every round under CM and DM, but not under fiat trade. Hence, if tokens are
used as money we should see that, if all three goods are available, player 2 trades
less than in Baseline. In Fiat the trading probability for player 2 fell to 0.56 from
0.73 in Baseline, a significant decline (p-value=0.080, N=874).
6 Discussion
In the theory of money, a medium of exchange naturally emerges when specializa-
tion inhibits barter, and trade frictions forestall coordination on trading conventions
that do not require money. In this situation, exchanging an object that cannot be
consumed but can be easily re-traded is a profitable alternative. But, this argument
is supported by assuming a bilateral matching process, while ruling out the possi-
bility that individuals may seek to improve it. Here, we have lifted this restriction
by developing a “travelling game” in which players can choose between decentral-
ized asynchronous monetary trade, DM, and centralized synchronous non-monetary
trade, CM. The laboratory data we have collected provide evidence in support of
some of the intuitions of the monetary literature, but not of others.
Overall, the theory does a good job at organizing the data (Result 1). However,
decentralized monetary trade prevailed in the frictionless baseline design, when in
fact standard arguments would have predicted coordination on the socially efficient
CM (Result 2). As CM is characterized by large payoff differentials, while DM
is not, one could point to inequality aversion as the primary reason for this result.
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And yet, non-monetary trade prevailed when subjects could coordinate their actions
through pre-play communication (Result 6). This outcome reversal suggests that
communication facilitated the high-earners’ task to convince player 1 to go along
with CM trade by travelling to island 2, even if by doing so they forego the larger
payoff associated with DM trade. As equilibrium multiplicity gives rise to strategic
uncertainty, we have argued that coordination problems are one of the possible
explanations for the emergence of monetary trade. In all treatments, subjects could
coordinate either on the efficient CM equilibrium or on DM, but only monetary
trade was risk-dominant. We see a predominance of CM only when subjects could
explicitly communicate with each other. This suggests a need to improve the theory
of money by taking into account coordination and equilibrium selection problems.
Adding matching frictions—in Rematch and in Large—supported coordina-
tion on monetary trade, but did not boost it above the frictionless baseline (Result
3). In fact, we see a bit of a shift from DM to CM and less coordination as com-
pared to Baseline (Result 5). Again, this is not what a monetary theorist would
have expected. A possible explanation lies in the misalignment of players’ incentives:
player 1 prefers DM to CM, while the reverse holds true for players 2 and 3. We have
evidence that both players 1 and 2 attempted to derail the equilibrium they least
desired. These conflicting incentives make coordination on equilibrium inherently
difficult, especially when counterparts are unstable, which may slow down learning.
Matching frictions make counterparts unstable, which may also motivate subjects
to repeatedly signal their preferred outcome by derailing their least preferred one.
Rotation of types led to a shift from monetary decentralized to non-monetary
centralized exchange, even with matching frictions (Results 3 and 4). Since CM is
socially efficient, this result is in line with monetary theory. However, CM did not
prevail over DM in the rotation treatments, when in fact it prevailed in the Chat
treatment where there was no rotation. This suggests that rotation made CM more
salient than in Baseline, but coordination remained a problem. What made CM
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salient with rotation? We have argued that, besides coordination problems, inequal-
ity concerns help to explain the emergence of monetary trade. Rotation re-aligns
the incentives across participants, who can take turns in sharing the greater surplus
offered by the socially efficient CM trade. This makes CM more attractive from
a dynamic perspective. Type alternation is especially meaningful when groups are
fixed throughout the session, which unlocks reciprocity schemes. In this case, one
can view a session as an indefinite sequence of the travelling games in which endow-
ments are redistributed at random points. According to this view, a subject’s lower
earnings in an early block can be compensated with higher earnings in subsequent
blocks. There is support for this view in the data. When roles rotate, players 1
more frequently travel to meet players 2. Players 2 more frequently turn down the
commodity money, good 1, to motivate others to coordinate on CM trade, which is
more profitable for them.
Though these findings do not invalidate the fundamental intuitions from the
theory of money, they do suggest improvements that might narrow the gap between
theoretical intuitions and laboratory evidence. In particular, we wish to offer two
considerations. The first one concerns the common view that money is adopted only
if it overcomes the inefficiencies of alternative trading arrangements, and the imprac-
ticality of barter. Underlying this view is the idea that efficiency maximization is the
overarching principle guiding the selection of trading arrangements. Our experiment
suggests that coordination and distributional issues are also important considera-
tions, a message that emerges also from different experimental designs (Camera and
Casari, 2014; Camera et al., 2013). Commodity-money trade prevailed over efficient
non-monetary trade when this yielded unbalanced payoffs (Result 2), a result that is
partly reversed only when the structure of incentives was dynamically re-aligned by
role-alternation in the session (Result 3). Moreover, when we added the option to
engage in inefficient bilateral barter—without altering the structure of incentives—
the low transport-cost good was often bartered, which completely crowded out other
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forms of trade, including the efficient one (Result 7). It is perhaps reasonable that
barter supplanted DM, which exhibits a more complicated, hence possibly less in-
tuitive, dynamic pattern. But why did barter crowd out efficient CM? We can rule
out aversion to inequality as an explanation. Barter payoffs are highly unequal, as
one player type never consumes; moreover, in Barter, types rotated during the
session, smoothing out the large payoff differences of CM. A possible reason is that
barter reduces strategic uncertainty for player 2. It is not possible to attain CM
equilibrium without player 1 choosing to travel; knowing that player 1 is reluctant
to do so given high travel costs, player 2 expects greater earnings from producing
and bartering good 1 on island 1, instead of trading trilaterally. This matches the
observation that the majority of barter trades involved player 2 visiting island 1
after producing good 1. Another possibility is that peer-to-peer exchange is more
salient than multi-party exchange, possibly because it only requires bilateral coor-
dination. Yet another motive could be a behavioral bias to acquire objects with the
best intrinsic properties—in our case a low travel-cost. Data from the Fiat treat-
ment supports this view. Adding a zero transport-cost token led to fiat monetary
trade, crowding out the payoff-superior commodity money equilibrium (Result 8).
A second consideration concerns the role of two common assumptions in the
foundations-of-money literature: the meeting process is bilateral, and players’ incen-
tives are perfectly aligned. With these assumptions, coordination on decentralized
monetary trade becomes a natural outcome. The experiment lifted both restrictions
and reveals that centralized non-monetary trade emerges when strategic uncertainty
can be mitigated through explicit communication—even if players’ incentives are
conflicting—but also when players’ incentives are re-aligned through alternation in
economic tasks. In this sense the experiment shows that to better understand the
emergence of monetary systems the theory of money should accommodate meet-
ing processes and incentive structures that are less rigid than the ones currently
assumed.
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Appendix: Existence of CM and DM equilibrium
Definition 1 (DM trade strategy). Player 1 never travels, while players 3 and
2 alternate travelling with good 1 to islands 2 and 1, respectively. In every meeting,
every player agrees to exchange their inventory for their consumption good. In a
bilateral meeting, player 2 also agrees to exchange his production for good 1. All
other possible trades are refused.
Let vj denote the DM equilibrium payoff for player j at the start of a period
s = 0, 1, where 1 means odd, and 0 even. When no confusion arises, we omit the
distribution of objects and the period s as an argument of vj. We want to prove the
following: If
c1 < u < c2(1 + β),
then decentralized trade is a Nash equilibrium. The equilibrium payoffs in a period
s = 0, 1 are:
v1 = βsu/(1− β2)
v2 = βs(u− c1)/(1− β2)
v3 = β1−s(u− c1)/(1− β2).
(1)
In each period the actions of a player depend on his state (his inventory at
the start of the period) and the distribution of goods at the start of a period. In
equilibrium player 3 has good 1; player 1 has good 2; player 2 alternates holding
good 3 to good 1 (in odd and even periods). All DM exchanges are bilateral and
all players trade to acquire their consumption good. Player 2 also trades to acquire
the low transport-cost good 1. Only the player with good 1 travels in a period.
In odd periods t = 1, 3, . . . player 3 visits island 2 to buy good 3 from player 2.
In even periods t = 2, 4 . . . player 2 visits island 1 to buy good 2 from player 1.
This explains the payoff expressions v1, v2, v3. Given the experimental parameters
we have v2 < v1 < v3 in odd periods, and v3 < v2 < v1 in even periods.
The Supplementary Information checks all possible deviations and demonstrates
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that we need u ≤ c2(1 + β) to ensure that player 1 has no incentive to deviate
and visit island 2 in odd periods (to do trilateral exchange, which is never refused
because all players always trade for their consumption good). We need u > c1 or
otherwise v2, v3 < 0.
Definition 2 (CM trade strategy). In every period player 2 remains on island
2, while the other players travel to island 2 if and only if every player holds their
production good. In every meeting, a player agrees to trade his production for his
consumption good, and refuses to trade otherwise.
We want to prove the following: If u > c2, then centralized trade is a Nash
equilibrium, with payoffs wi to type i = 1, 2, 3 given by
w1 =
u− c2
1− β < w3 =
u− c1
1− β < w2 =
u
1− β . (2)
The CM strategy is time-invariant and depends on the distribution of goods
across players. In CM, a player can deviate by not travelling to island 2, or by trav-
elling but refusing to participate in the goods’ reallocation scheme, thus retaining
his inventory. Any equilibrium deviation leads to no trade (bilateral or trilateral) in
the period, but does not affect the distribution of goods in the following period. The
reason is that lack of consensus on the reallocation implies no trade. Subjects can
propose to bilaterally trade, in this case, but the strategy in Definition 2 calls for
trade only if it guarantees consumption so no trade occurs off equilibrium. There-
fore, every unilateral deviation is suboptimal. Now note that player 1 has the lowest
payoff in CM, and therefore we need w1 > 0, hence u > c2.
It should be clear that if c2 < u < c2(1 + β), then CM and DM equilibrium
coexist. In all treatments, except No CM, both patterns of trade, decentralized
and centralized, are equilibria because in the experiment c2 = 10 < u = 12 <
c2(1 + β) = 17.5.
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Now we prove that CM maximizes average payoffs but does not Pareto-dominate
DM. The average payoff in CM is w := u1− β −
c1 + c2
3(1− β) , in each period, while in
DM it is
v(s) := u− c13(1− β) +
βsu
3(1− β2) ,
with v(0) > v(1), i.e., it is highest in an even period, s = 0, when two players
consume. Hence, CM is socially efficient if w > v(0), which simplifies to
u > u∗ := c2(1 + β)1 + 2β .
Since coexistence of DM and CM requires c2 < u, and u∗ < c2, we have the result.
Finally, to show that no equilibrium is Pareto dominant note that v1 > w1 in
any period because c2 < u < c2(1 + β) with our parameters. However, v2 < w2 and
v3 < w3, always.
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